2015 年，世上還沒(méi)有任何針對(duì)醫(yī)院的勒索攻擊，而 2016年已經(jīng)有 10 起了。這些網(wǎng)絡(luò)罪犯將滲入各個(gè)領(lǐng)域的內(nèi)部網(wǎng)絡(luò)，控制用戶(hù)的計(jì)算機(jī)系統(tǒng)，并向這些受到非法控制的目標(biāo)勒索贖金——這就是黑客掙錢(qián)的手段。目前，盡管我們還沒(méi)有遇到任何針對(duì)汽車(chē)的勒索攻擊，但目前的現(xiàn)狀已經(jīng)足夠引起汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全專(zhuān)家的警惕。
荷蘭 Irdeto 公司首席汽車(chē)安全架構(gòu)師 Stacy Janes 解釋說(shuō)，“汽車(chē)有很多可能受到攻擊的‘點(diǎn)’，而一些不懷好意的人就可以通過(guò)這些‘點(diǎn)’向車(chē)輛植入各種惡意軟件，有時(shí)甚至都不需要真正進(jìn)入車(chē)輛的內(nèi)部網(wǎng)絡(luò)。”除了大量應(yīng)用程序，車(chē)輛最易受到攻擊的“點(diǎn)”是一些面向外部網(wǎng)絡(luò)的網(wǎng)關(guān)，比如車(chē)輛遠(yuǎn)程信息處理系統(tǒng)、OBDII 端口和車(chē)載信息娛樂(lè)系統(tǒng) (IVI) 等。
《汽車(chē)黑客指南》(The Car Hacker’s Handbook) 一書(shū)的作者、電氣工程師 Craig Smith 表示，車(chē)載信息娛樂(lè)系統(tǒng)比其他任何車(chē)輛組件都更易遭遇遠(yuǎn)程攻擊。黑客只要拿到信息娛樂(lè)系統(tǒng)的鑰匙（即訪問(wèn)權(quán)限），就相當(dāng)于打開(kāi)了汽車(chē)的大門(mén)。此時(shí)，整個(gè)汽車(chē)系統(tǒng)都將清晰地平鋪在黑客面前：車(chē)輛的 CAN 總線數(shù)據(jù)包如何傳輸；ECU 單元如何升級(jí)；車(chē)輛是否會(huì)向原始設(shè)備廠商傳回?cái)?shù)據(jù)，傳回哪些數(shù)據(jù)以及如何傳回?cái)?shù)據(jù)等。
Janes 表示，未來(lái)，汽車(chē)?yán)账鞴艨赡芫褪峭ㄟ^(guò)滲入車(chē)輛信息娛樂(lè)系統(tǒng)實(shí)現(xiàn)的。想象一下這個(gè)場(chǎng)景：你早上起床準(zhǔn)備開(kāi)車(chē)去上班。你打開(kāi)了車(chē)上的信息娛樂(lè)系統(tǒng)，接著系統(tǒng)屏幕開(kāi)始瘋狂閃爍、音頻系統(tǒng)的音量不斷升高、暖氣也開(kāi)到了最大馬力，關(guān)鍵是你根本關(guān)不掉。這時(shí)，你什么也做不了，只能選擇把車(chē)拖到經(jīng)銷(xiāo)商那里。然而，經(jīng)銷(xiāo)店里已經(jīng)停了一大批受到相同攻擊的車(chē)輛。
此時(shí)，經(jīng)銷(xiāo)商的服務(wù)經(jīng)理已經(jīng)聯(lián)系了廠商，而廠商表示目前受到影響的車(chē)輛已達(dá)數(shù)千輛。然而，攻擊并沒(méi)有停止。當(dāng)天晚些時(shí)候，汽車(chē)廠商終于收到一封匿名郵件：“明天之內(nèi)，請(qǐng)向我們支付價(jià)值百萬(wàn)美元的比特幣，否則全世界都將知道這一切，這會(huì)毀了您的品牌，您一定很清楚這一點(diǎn)。祝您愉快。”
公共安全問(wèn)題
七年前，羅格斯大學(xué) (Rutgers University) 和南卡羅萊納大學(xué) (University of South Carolina) 的研究人員成功為車(chē)輛安裝了一款非加密胎壓監(jiān)測(cè)系統(tǒng)（TPMS）。這個(gè)系統(tǒng)可以“惡搞”儀表盤(pán)，顯示錯(cuò)誤的胎壓讀數(shù)，并跟蹤車(chē)輛行駛記錄。他們當(dāng)時(shí)肯定沒(méi)想到，會(huì)出現(xiàn)今天的情況。2011 年，安全情報(bào)專(zhuān)家 Charlie Miller 和 Chris Valasek 博士成功“黑入”一輛豐田普銳斯 (Toyota Prius) 和福特 (Ford) Escape，禁用了車(chē)輛的動(dòng)力轉(zhuǎn)向系統(tǒng)、控制了車(chē)輛喇叭，還把儀表盤(pán)搞得一團(tuán)糟。這里，值得說(shuō)明的是，他們兩位并非真正意義上的“黑客”，而是兩位汽車(chē)安全專(zhuān)家，他們拿到了美國(guó)國(guó)防部高級(jí)研究計(jì)劃局 (DARPA) 的研發(fā)經(jīng)費(fèi)，專(zhuān)門(mén)負(fù)責(zé)探測(cè)車(chē)輛的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全弱點(diǎn)。
2015 年，Miller 和 Valasek 又成功遠(yuǎn)程控制了一款吉普大切諾基 (Jeep Grand Cherokee)，此舉也最終導(dǎo)致克萊斯勒 (Chrysler) 召回 140 萬(wàn)輛汽車(chē)，并向車(chē)主派發(fā) USB 軟件更新驅(qū)動(dòng)。此后，加州大學(xué) (University of California) 的研究人員也演示了如何通過(guò)保險(xiǎn)公司安裝在車(chē)輛 OBD 端口上的“加密狗”，成功禁用一輛克爾維特 (Corvette) 的剎車(chē)系統(tǒng)，并啟動(dòng)了車(chē)輛雨刷。此時(shí)，整個(gè)汽車(chē)行業(yè)都被驚醒了。
GENIVI 聯(lián)盟網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全團(tuán)隊(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人 Janes 表示，“從安全的角度來(lái)看，與其他領(lǐng)域的黑客活動(dòng)相比，汽車(chē)領(lǐng)域的攻擊手段仍處于初級(jí)水平。”Janes 稱(chēng)當(dāng)前為“研究階段”。
“現(xiàn)在，攻擊者正在研究汽車(chē)，而汽車(chē)行業(yè)也在研究黑客。只要汽車(chē)人能保持略微領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢(shì)，汽車(chē)行業(yè)就大可不必為攻擊而擔(dān)心。”Janes 表示，“只要汽車(chē)行業(yè)能夠占據(jù)一點(diǎn)優(yōu)勢(shì)，黑客就必須投入更多資金，才能發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)無(wú)懈可擊的攻擊，而這樣的成本對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)太高了。”
但相反，如果汽車(chē)廠商稍有落后，壞人就會(huì)越來(lái)越猖狂。“金融、移動(dòng)通信、媒體，甚至醫(yī)療保健系統(tǒng)等其他行業(yè)都存在這樣的攻擊。”Janes 說(shuō)，“這些網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊就是一門(mén)生意。有時(shí)，他們發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)攻擊可能要花 100 萬(wàn)美元，但卻能掙 1000 萬(wàn)美元。這樣算的話，‘投資回報(bào)率’還是很不錯(cuò)的。在這種情況下，汽車(chē)行業(yè)必須時(shí)刻領(lǐng)先黑客，這樣才能增加黑客發(fā)動(dòng)汽車(chē)攻擊的成本，迫使他們轉(zhuǎn)向其他領(lǐng)域。”
《汽車(chē)工程》采訪的一些專(zhuān)家認(rèn)為，隨著網(wǎng)聯(lián)汽車(chē)和自動(dòng)駕駛汽車(chē)的市場(chǎng)份額不斷增加，車(chē)輛網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊威脅也會(huì)不斷升級(jí)。目前，美國(guó)新車(chē)銷(xiāo)售中超過(guò)半數(shù)均為網(wǎng)聯(lián)汽車(chē)，在此背景下，可能遭到攻擊的潛在漏洞數(shù)量也在不斷累加。到 2020 年，全球預(yù)計(jì)將有超過(guò) 2.5 億輛網(wǎng)聯(lián)汽車(chē)投入使用。
2015 年，為了共同面對(duì)日益嚴(yán)重的威脅，OEM和供應(yīng)商一起成立了汽車(chē)信息共享和分析中心 (Auto-ISAC)，從而共同解決汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。目前，Auto-ISAC 大約有 30 個(gè)成員，將不間斷分享任何與互聯(lián)汽車(chē)有關(guān)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)威脅、漏洞、相關(guān)事故進(jìn)展及大量追蹤與分析數(shù)據(jù)。
SAE International是 Auto-ISAC 社區(qū)的重要組成部分，目前已經(jīng)出版了 7 部相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，其中包括世界上首部汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全推薦指南— J3061。SAE 新項(xiàng)目發(fā)展經(jīng)理 Patti Kreh 表示，“SAE 希望能夠成為汽車(chē)行業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴。在我們看來(lái)，合作可以產(chǎn)生很多協(xié)同效應(yīng)，而整個(gè)行業(yè)都將受益。”
2016 年底特律網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全峰會(huì)期間，通用汽車(chē) CEO Mary Barra 在其主旨演講中指出：“所有汽車(chē)制造商都要面對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全事故，這是一項(xiàng)公共安全問(wèn)題。”
隔離與“分層防御”
目前，最好的端對(duì)端汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全防御措施是“可以完整覆蓋整個(gè)汽車(chē)互聯(lián)生態(tài)環(huán)境的多層防御系統(tǒng)。”哈曼國(guó)際高級(jí)營(yíng)銷(xiāo)總監(jiān) Dvir Reznik 表示，“在網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全領(lǐng)域沒(méi)有所謂的靈丹妙藥。”
專(zhuān)家們同意，“縱深安全”防御軟件的各個(gè)組成部分，應(yīng)當(dāng)像樂(lè)高積木一樣相互緊密相連，其中包括次級(jí)系統(tǒng)電子控制單元代碼、所有內(nèi)部網(wǎng)絡(luò)通信監(jiān)控代碼，及一些在出現(xiàn)異常行為時(shí)發(fā)出警報(bào)的代碼。這些代碼的主要功能是防止網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊升級(jí)。此外，車(chē)輛信息娛樂(lè)系統(tǒng)等面向外部網(wǎng)絡(luò)的模塊，也是網(wǎng)絡(luò)防御軟件的重要保護(hù)對(duì)象。
SRI 國(guó)際 (SRI International) 是一家進(jìn)行國(guó)家級(jí)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全研究和分析的獨(dú)立非盈利研發(fā)中心。該機(jī)構(gòu)項(xiàng)目總監(jiān) Ulf Lindqvist 表示，汽車(chē)保護(hù)措施的應(yīng)用廣泛，設(shè)置應(yīng)該相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)潔。“安全的關(guān)鍵在于隔離，”Lindqvist 說(shuō)，“汽車(chē)系統(tǒng)可以通過(guò)授權(quán)與 CAN 總線進(jìn)行交互，但這并不意味著我們提倡這樣做。”他繼續(xù)說(shuō)，問(wèn)題在于，“人們似乎總是喜歡為了各種目的，而隨意去連接車(chē)輛系統(tǒng)。”
目前，一些云安全服務(wù)產(chǎn)品開(kāi)始進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)。這些產(chǎn)品經(jīng)過(guò)專(zhuān)門(mén)設(shè)計(jì)，可以提前檢測(cè)和處理車(chē)輛網(wǎng)絡(luò)威脅，而且還支持 OTA 空中升級(jí)和實(shí)時(shí)信息傳遞。很多廠商都需要這樣的端到端解決方案，這也是哈曼 (Harman)和 IBM 安全 (IBM Security) 等公司開(kāi)始提供擴(kuò)展“安全套裝”的原因之一。
Argus Cyber Security 是汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全解決方案領(lǐng)域的先鋒。這家公司最初的“網(wǎng)關(guān)盒子”可以為汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)創(chuàng)建一道獨(dú)立防火墻，不斷掃描 CAN 總線信息，并在發(fā)現(xiàn)異常時(shí)及時(shí)關(guān)閉網(wǎng)絡(luò)。Argus 目前的解決方案是將監(jiān)測(cè)組件安裝至車(chē)輛的一個(gè)或多個(gè)電子控制單元中。此外，Caramba、哈曼 (Harman)和諾基亞 (Nokia) 等其他領(lǐng)先行業(yè)公司也可以提供類(lèi)似的解決方案。
Argus 北美業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展執(zhí)行總監(jiān) Meg Novacek 表示，一個(gè)理想的汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全架構(gòu)應(yīng)有四個(gè)組成部分，分別為安全通信網(wǎng)關(guān)；可以立即識(shí)別/阻止網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊的入侵檢測(cè)/預(yù)防系統(tǒng) (IDPS)；汽車(chē)軟件 OTA 更新功能，及某些集成了遠(yuǎn)程認(rèn)證功能的主要硬件安全模塊。
Caramba 軟件工程師編寫(xiě)的二進(jìn)制車(chē)輛代碼中，也包括公司專(zhuān)門(mén)用于監(jiān)控的“數(shù)字指紋”代碼。一旦植入車(chē)輛，這些代碼即可進(jìn)行不間斷的監(jiān)控，如果有任何東西試圖改變“數(shù)字指紋”或者覆蓋任何內(nèi)容，系統(tǒng)即會(huì)立刻斷開(kāi)網(wǎng)絡(luò)連接。
Navigant Research 分析師 Sam Abuelsamid 表示，這種措施的優(yōu)勢(shì)在于：“汽車(chē)廠商所確定的車(chē)輛系統(tǒng)架構(gòu)是固定的，任何試圖做出改變的外部操作，都會(huì)導(dǎo)致整個(gè)系統(tǒng)的關(guān)閉。”
一些工程師和網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全專(zhuān)家表示，機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)和人工智能 (AI) 也很有可能成為異常檢測(cè)的解決方案。巴特爾紀(jì)念研究所 (Battelle Memorial Institute) 等一些此類(lèi)技術(shù)的支持機(jī)構(gòu)表示，這種系統(tǒng)對(duì)具體平臺(tái)并無(wú)區(qū)別對(duì)待，可以適用于任何車(chē)載電子控制單元，不需要對(duì)簽名數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)和發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)檢測(cè)元件進(jìn)行定期更新。在這種系統(tǒng)中，一旦監(jiān)測(cè)到任何異常，系統(tǒng)即會(huì)根據(jù)威脅的嚴(yán)重程度，采取不同等級(jí)的措施，包括發(fā)出聲音警報(bào)、采取車(chē)輛干預(yù)措施（如“自我保護(hù)”模式），或直接通知緊急救援機(jī)構(gòu)等。
無(wú)盡的戰(zhàn)斗
目前，一些公司正在開(kāi)發(fā)可以在威脅解除后，將車(chē)輛恢復(fù)至之前狀態(tài)的“自愈”軟件代碼，也就是大家所熟知的區(qū)塊鏈技術(shù)。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，區(qū)塊鏈可通過(guò)獨(dú)立計(jì)算機(jī)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，也就是分布式總賬系統(tǒng)發(fā)送信息，保護(hù)數(shù)據(jù)和財(cái)產(chǎn)安全，進(jìn)而保護(hù)交易和所有權(quán)的安全。豐田研究院 (Toyota Research Institute) 正在與 MIT 媒體實(shí)驗(yàn)室及其他合作伙伴共同進(jìn)行區(qū)塊鏈研究。許多專(zhuān)家認(rèn)為，這種技術(shù)可以促進(jìn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全自動(dòng)駕駛技術(shù)的發(fā)展。
值得一提的是，所有網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全專(zhuān)家均已達(dá)成共識(shí)：黑客攻擊將永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)停止。
“在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域中，誰(shuí)都無(wú)法做出任何保證。”SRI 國(guó)際的 Lindqvist 表示，“我們能做的是盡量減少黑客出現(xiàn)的幾率，并限制他們可能產(chǎn)生的影響。”
Irdeto 的 Janes 表示，“這是一場(chǎng)間諜之間的大戰(zhàn)。”Janes 等人表示，一些OEM和一級(jí)供應(yīng)商已經(jīng)開(kāi)始讓網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全工程師共同參與車(chē)輛電氣架構(gòu)和次級(jí)系統(tǒng)的設(shè)計(jì)?，F(xiàn)階段，他們正在進(jìn)行詳細(xì)的威脅分析，并開(kāi)始將安全需求加入供應(yīng)商的報(bào)價(jià)申請(qǐng)書(shū) (RFQ) 中，這種做法可以將網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全需求逐級(jí)傳遞至不同級(jí)別的供應(yīng)商。
“我們可以說(shuō)自動(dòng)駕駛汽車(chē)行業(yè)非常脆弱，只要發(fā)生幾起造成人員傷亡的自動(dòng)駕駛汽車(chē)網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊事故，整個(gè)行業(yè)就全完了。”Janes 說(shuō)，“工程師需要站在黑客的角度思考問(wèn)題，理解他們的想法，并順著他們的思路采用更有效的應(yīng)對(duì)措施。”
In 2015 there was no such thing as a ransomware attack against a hospital. In 2016 there were 10 such attacks. The cyber criminals who penetrate and disable computer networks until users pay ransom, profit from vulnerable and easy targets. And while there have yet been no ransomware attacks against automobiles, they’re the threat cybersecurity experts fear the most.
“There are multiple ‘attack surfaces’ in vehicles through which nefarious players can plant bad software; you don’t need to be on the internal networks,” explained Stacy Janes, Chief Security Architect – Automotive, at Netherlands-based Irdeto. Along with various apps, the most vulnerable points of entry are those on the outward-facing gateways: vehicle telematics, the OBDII port and the IVI (in-vehicle infotainment) stack—all of which connect the vehicle to outside communications.
The IVI system offers more remote attack surfaces than any other vehicle component, notes electrical engineer Craig Smith, author of The Car Hacker’s Handbook. Gaining access to the IVI “opens a door to additional info” about how the vehicle works, such as how it routes CAN bus packets and updates the ECU. Understanding the IVI system can also provide insight into whether the system ‘phones home’ to the OEM; if it does, hackers can use access to the IVI to see what data is being collected and potentially transmitted back to the manufacturer.
Penetrating the IVI system is how a real-world ransomware attack on the mobility industry might play out, said Janes. He offers a scenario: You get in the car, turn it on and the IVI screen starts strobing wildly. The audio system volume cranks up, the heat comes on full blast and you can’t shut it off. There’s nothing you can do, so you get the car towed to a dealership—which is jammed with vehicles victimized by the same attack.
The dealer’s service manager already has contacted the OEM, which says thousands of vehicles are afflicted. And the attacks continue. Later in the day, the OEM receives an anonymous email: “Tomorrow, your company pays us millions in bitcoin or we’ll release a statement on what we did. We’ll destroy your brand. Have a nice day.”
A matter of public safety
Such a cybersecurity scenario was not envisioned seven years ago, when researchers at Rutgers University and the University of South Carolina successfully penetrated a non-encrypted tire-pressure monitoring system (TPMS) and were able to display false tire-pressure reading “spoofs” on the cluster—and track the car’s movements. In 2011, security intelligence experts Dr. Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek, working on a DARPA grant to probe vehicle cyber-weaknesses, hacked a Toyota Prius and a Ford Escape, disabling the power steering, taking control of horns and playing havoc with cluster displays.
Miller and Valasek then executed their seminal 2015 remote hijacking of a Jeep Grand Cherokee, prompting Chrysler to recall 1.4 million vehicles and dispatch USB drives with software updates to owners. The mobility sector was awakened, but not before University of California researchers demonstrated they could disable a Corvette’s brakes and activate its windshield wipers by hacking the insurance-company dongle plugged into the car’s OBD port.
“From a security perspective those were all very basic attacks, compared to what we see in other markets,” observed Janes, who is also the cyber team lead for the GENIVI alliance. He calls the current era “the researcher phase.”
“Right now, you have attackers learning about cars and car people learning about security. As long as the car people stay a bit ahead, the attackers won’t bother with autos,” he said, “because they’ll have to invest too much money in order to mount a sophisticated attack.”
But if the OEMs fall behind, the bad guys will get bolder. “We saw this with attacks in other industries—financial, mobile, media companies, healthcare,” Janes said. “The attackers are a business. Some attacks can cost $1 million to execute, but they make $10 million—not a bad ROI, right? Automotive needs to get ahead of it and stay ahead, so it gets too costly for the attackers and they move on to another sector.”
The experts Automotive Engineering interviewed for this article believe the cyberattack threat will only increase as connected and autonomous vehicles gain market share. Already, over half of the vehicles sold in the U.S. are connected, with an expanding number of potential vulnerabilities. More than 250 million connected cars are expected to be in use by 2020.
Unifying to face the growing threat, OEMs and suppliers in 2015 founded the Auto-ISAC (information sharing and analysis center), a global community to address vehicle cybersecurity risks. With around 30 members, Auto-ISAC operates a central hub for sharing, tracking and analyzing intelligence about cyber threats, vulnerabilities and incidents related to the connected vehicle.
SAE International is part of the Auto-ISAC community, having published seven related Standards, including J3061, the world’s first automotive recommended practices on the topic. “SAE hopes to be a strategic partner—we see many synergies to benefit the entire industry,” said Patti Kreh, SAE’s New Program Development Manager.
A cyber incident “is a problem for every automaker in the world,” asserted General Motors CEO Mary Barra in her keynote at the 2016 Cybersecurity Summit in Detroit. “It is a matter of public safety.”
Separation and ‘layered defense’
The best end-to-end defense in automotive cybersecurity is “a multi-layer approach involving the complete ecosystem of connected vehicles,” said Dvir Reznik, Senior Marketing Director at Harman International. “There is no ‘silver bullet’ in this space.”
Known as “security in depth,” the building-blocks of defensive software should fit together like a Lego structure, the experts agree. They include code installed in subsystem ECUs and those which monitor all internal network communications, alerting the system to any changes in normal network behavior. Their job is to halt attacks from advancing within the network. The outward-facing modules such as IVI head units “on the vehicle perimeter” also are the focus of cyber-defense software products.
Ulf Lindqvist, program director at SRI International, an independent non-profit research center involved with national-security level cybersecurity research and analysis, said a broad automotive protection approach should be relatively simple. “Security really is all about separation,” he noted. “Just because [a system] is authorized to talk to the CAN bus doesn’t mean you should do so.” The problem, he continued, is “there always seems to be some reason or another to connect” quasi-related vehicle systems.
And cloud security products and services are entering the market. These are designed to detect and address threats before they reach the vehicle. They also can transmit over-the-air (OTA) updates and intelligence in real time. OEMs are demanding such end-to-end solutions, one of the drivers behind companies such as Harman and IBM Security joining forces earlier this year to offer expanded “security suites.”
A pioneer in automotive cybersecurity solutions is Argus Cyber Security. The company's original “gateway box” was added to the vehicle network to create a discrete firewall that searched CAN messages and shut down the network if an anomaly was detected. Argus’s current technology builds the monitoring component into one or more ECUs on the vehicle. Other leading cybersecurity firms, including Caramba, Harman and Nokia offer similar approaches.
Meg Novacek, Argus executive director for North America business development, said the company’s vision of the ideal automotive cybersecurity architecture is comprised of four elements: a secure communications gateway; the company’s Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) system that can immediately identify a cyber-attack and block it; OTA updates for vehicle software and some type of principal hardware security module that incorporates remote-attestation capabilities.
When Caramba’s software engineers build the binary code that goes into the vehicle, it includes some of Caramba’s own code that basically takes a ‘digital fingerprint’ of the binary. Once installed in the vehicle, it is constantly monitoring. And if anything tries to change that ‘fingerprint’ or overwrite anything, it shuts the network down.
The advantage of this approach is that “you know from the factory what is supposed to be in there. If anything alien tries to alter that, the whole thing gets shut down,” observes analyst Sam Abuelsamid of Navigant Research.
Some engineers and cyber-security experts say machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) are potential solutions for anomaly detection. Advocates including the Battelle Memorial Institute say they are also platform-agnostic, can be applied to any onboard ECU and don’t require constant updating of signature databases and detection-engine components. In such systems, abnormalities detected can generate audible alerts, vehicle intervention (such as limp-home mode) or directly notify first responders, depending on the severity of the threat.
An endless battle
“Self-healing” software code that can be changed back to original form after it’s compromised, is in development at some companies, as is Blockchain technology. Blockchain sends information over a network of independent computers, known as a distributed ledger, intended to ensure that the transaction is secure and ownership rights over the data or property are protected. The Toyota Research Institute (TRI) is exploring blockchain in collaboration with the MIT Media Lab and other partners. Many experts believe it could accelerate development of cyber-secure autonomous driving technology.
One point on which all cyber-security experts agree is hacking will never end.
“It’s really hard to make guarantees in this space,” said SRI’s Lindqvist. “We have to get to the place where successful hacks are rare—and they have to have limited consequences.”
“This is a Spy vs. Spy kind of game,” noted Irdeto’s Janes. He and others said some OEMs and Tier 1s have begun incorporating network-security engineers into their electrical architecture and subsystem design processes. They’re conducting detailed threat analyses and baking security into RFQs, pushing cyber requirements down through the tiers.
“If you want to kill the autonomous-vehicle industry, let an autonomous car get maliciously hacked with injuries or lives lost,” he said. “Engineers need to adopt a hacker’s view of the world to understand and defeat the threat.”
Author: Lindsay Brooke and Bill Visnic
Source: SAE Automotive Engineering Magazine
專(zhuān)家指出，車(chē)載信息娛樂(lè)系統(tǒng)遭遇遠(yuǎn)程攻擊的幾率遠(yuǎn)高于其他任何車(chē)輛組件。
大陸集團(tuán)的云安全產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)經(jīng)過(guò)了專(zhuān)門(mén)設(shè)計(jì)，可以提前檢測(cè)并處理車(chē)輛面臨的網(wǎng)絡(luò)威脅，而且還同時(shí)支持 OTA 空中升級(jí)和實(shí)時(shí)信息傳遞。（圖片來(lái)源：大陸）